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S u m m a r y
California’s ongoing budget crises have prompted a serious evaluation of the state’s revenue system. The state’s revenue is more volatile than that in other states, and this volatility can be attributed, in part, to California’s tax structure.  
Also of considerable concern is whether the state’s tax system promotes economic activ-
ity while providing a fair distribution of the tax burden. Moreover, California relies heavily 
on state-level tax collections to finance state and local public expenditures, and thus its tax 
structure plays a critical role in the functioning of the state’s economy.
In the 2009–10 fiscal year, California collected roughly $27 billion in sales and use taxes 
for the state’s general fund, $45 billion in individual income taxes, and $10 billion in corpo-
rate income taxes (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). These three taxes together consistently 
account for over 90 percent of the state’s general fund revenues. As in many states, Califor-
nia’s tax system relies heavily on taxing both personal and corporate income. However, many 
have suggested that a greater reliance on consumption taxes—taxes based on the consump-
tion that occurs in California, rather than on the income earned in the state—might improve 
the performance of the revenue system. This report reviews concerns about the current tax 
system and evaluates five potential consumption-based tax reforms. 
Retail sales tax (RST) reform. Much household consumption is excluded from taxation, 
including services and Internet sales, both of which have been growing steadily as a share of 
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household consumption. And a large share of the state’s sales tax is derived from purchases 
by businesses, raising the cost of doing business in California. Reforming the retail sales tax 
could address both of these issues, increasing the state’s revenue base while reducing the 
burden on businesses.
Corporate income tax reform. The California corporate income tax is a volatile source of rev-
enue, but it can be improved. Basing its apportionment exclusively on sales could enhance 
the state’s business climate. 
Gross receipts tax (GRT). This tax, recently introduced by several other states, would apply to 
all business sales, including interstate sales and sales to other businesses. It would broaden 
the tax base and provide greater stability in state revenues. However, it would raise produc-
tion costs and reduce California’s competitiveness by increasing the taxes imposed on busi-
ness purchases.
Value added tax (VAT). Like a retail sales tax levied only on sales to consumers, a value added 
tax is levied on consumption. Unlike a retail sales tax, a value added tax would impose taxes 
in stages, as production occurs. A value added tax might be less susceptible to tax evasion 
than the retail sales tax, but this potential advantage would need to be weighed against 
implementation costs. 
Sales-apportioned tax on value added. This tax, called a “business net receipts tax” (BNRT), 
would be based on national value added, with California’s share determined using a sales-
only apportionment formula. This tax would not be as effective at promoting production 
within the state, but it would be easier for an individual state to implement than a state-level 
value added tax.
In the following pages, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each option 
in terms of revenue volatility, economic distortions, equity, and ease of implementation 
and administration. In the end, reform of the existing tax structure may provide the most 
straightforward path to reform, particularly in light of the potential difficulties of introducing 
an entirely new tax system.
Please visit the report’s publication page to find related resources:
www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=937 
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Introduction
California’s current tax system has a number of short-
comings, most notably an approach that leads to volatile 
revenues and provisions that both foster an unfavorable 
business climate and distort consumer choice. Many have 
suggested that a greater reliance on consumption taxes—
taxes based on the consumption that occurs in California 
rather than on the income earned in the state—might 
improve the performance of California’s revenue system. 
Because consumption expenditures tend to be less volatile 
than the income sources upon which California’s income 
tax heavily depends—in particular, capital gains and corpo-
rate income—the revenues gained from a broad-based con-
sumption tax would likely be more stable over the economic 
cycle than those generated by the state’s current tax system.
As a tax on the purchases of goods and services, rather 
than on their production, a consumption tax could encour-
age production in California more than does our current 
system, which relies heavily on taxes levied on income 
from production in California. This is because taxing pro- 
duction raises the costs of California producers relative  
to those in other states. Taxing consumption, rather than  
production, might seem to impose a higher burden on 
California residents (in their capacity as consumers),  
but California is ultimately limited in its ability to shift  
the burden of any of its taxes to consumers elsewhere. 
However, several problems stand in the way of a shift 
toward consumption taxation.
• The closest thing California already has to a broad-
based consumption tax—its retail sales tax—fails to tax 
many elements of consumption while taxing many pro-
duction activities. As discussed below, if the retail sales 
tax were to become the basis of California’s move toward 
consumption taxation, it would first need to be reformed. 
• Legal roadblocks currently hinder the state’s ability 
to tax consumption in the form of purchases from 
out-of-state vendors when these vendors lack sufficient 
“nexus”—physical business presence—in California. 
The state’s limited ability to tax such transactions, 
which are of growing economic significance, would 
likely influence the design of alternative consumption 
tax approaches. 
• Many critics equate consumption taxation with regres-
sive taxation, because the share of income consumed 
tends to fall as income rises. Thus, evaluation of any 
potential major shift in the structure of taxation needs 
to include an assessment of who bears the burden of 
the shift. This is not simply a question of who pays 
the tax but much more importantly the incidence of 
Many have suggested that a greater reliance 
on consumption taxes might improve the 
performance of California’s revenue system.
Key definitions 
Business input: A product used in the manufacture of another 
product—for example, sugar used to make candy.
Deadweight loss: The economic cost of distortions of tax-
payer behavior; equivalent to a loss of income in excess of  
tax revenues collected.
Formula apportionment: A method by which a portion of 
a taxpayer’s national tax base is apportioned to a particular 
state according to the location of a factor or group of factors, 
typically some combination of sales, payroll, and assets.
Quill decision: 1992 Supreme Court decision that limited the 
ability of states to require that out-of-state vendors collect 
sales tax on remote purchases; arguably does not apply to the 
BNRT or the GRT.
Tax incidence: Analysis of who bears the economic burden 
of taxation.
Use tax: A tax imposed on purchasers in lieu of a retail sales 
tax on remote transactions where legal constraints limit a 
state’s ability to impose sales tax directly on vendors.
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the tax—i.e., who ultimately bears the tax burden, 
which may differ from those who pay the tax once 
the responses of taxpayers are taken into account. For 
example, the incidence of a tax levied on corporate 
income in California may fall partially on labor if capi-
tal moves to other states, thereby reducing the labor 
productivity and wages of California workers; or if the 
tax leads to higher prices, it may be borne in part by 
California consumers. 
• Any major change in tax structure, including a shift 
toward consumption taxation, will create different 
groups of winners and losers, by region, industry, popu-
lation, age, and so forth; however, an analysis of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this report.
In spite of all of these concerns, a shift toward a greater 
reliance on consumption taxes seems more feasible than a 
wholesale scrapping of the current tax system.
In the following sections, we discuss in detail some  
of the issues relevant to thinking about a shift toward 
consumption taxation at the state level. After reviewing the 
key characteristics of California’s existing tax system that 
relate to consumption taxation, we present and evaluate 
several reforms, including changes in the retail sales tax, 
modification of the state corporate income tax, the intro-
duction of a gross receipts tax, the adoption of a state-level 
value added tax, and the potential of a new but related tax, 
the business net receipts tax suggested by the Commission 
on the 21st Century Economy, a bipartisan commission 
established by the state government in 2009 to consider 
reform of California’s tax system.
One key point is that it is possible to tax consump-
tion in a variety of ways. Another is that it is important 
to focus on economic substance (what taxes do), rather 
than on their form (how taxes may officially be described), 
when considering the effects of a particular tax system. For 
example, taxes that some analysts might loosely describe 
as being consumption taxes may actually have different 
effects. As will be discussed, this is true of gross receipts 
taxes and, to some extent, the retail sales tax. By contrast, 
other taxes that have effects in some ways resembling 
consumption taxes may have a superficial structure that 
makes this resemblance less than apparent—for example, 
the corporate income tax apportioned based on sales  
location. The text box summarizes the tax policy objec-
tives discussed below. We provide more extensive details 
It is important to focus on economic  
substance (what taxes do), rather than on  
their form (how taxes may officially be 
described), when considering the effects of  
a particular tax system.   
Objectives of tax reform 
Throughout this report, several attributes will be taken as 
representative of a good tax system for California. As will be 
discussed, some of these carry over from a national perspec-
tive on tax reform whereas others are more applicable at the 
state level. These attributes include:
Broad-based, uniform taxation of final consumption, 
because consumer choice is distorted by variations in tax rates 
on consumption. 
Taxation based on the location of consumption rather than 
on production, because taxes on production add to the costs 
of in-state businesses relative to the costs faced by businesses 
in other states, thereby discouraging in-state production and 
employment.
Revenue stability, because revenue volatility has severe 
effects on a state’s public spending; states are restricted in 
their ability to borrow to reduce this volatility. 
Equity, because distributional fairness of the tax burden 
matters; equity concerns should not be based on who pays 
the tax but on its incidence—that is, on who ultimately bears 
the burden of the tax, taking into account the responses of 
taxpayers to a new tax system.
Ease of administration, taking into account federal and state 
legal and constitutional restrictions that might apply.
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and methodological explanations in a technical appendix, 
which is available on the PPIC website (www.ppic.org 
/content/pubs/other/611AAR_appendix.pdf).
Why Shift Toward Consumption 
Taxation in California?
From the perspective of California, the attractiveness of a 
consumption tax lies in its ability to reduce revenue volatil-
ity and increase the competitiveness of California compa-
nies relative to that of other states and countries.
Why is revenue volatility a problem? Most states, 
including California, face constitutional restraints on their 
ability to engage in long-term general fund borrowing. 
Although accumulation of substantial rainy day funds in 
good times might serve, in principle, to cushion swings  
in revenue without requiring that a state borrow to supple-
ment sudden declines in its tax revenue, accumulation of 
rainy day funds adequate for this purpose has not been a 
politically viable alternative. Thus, limits on borrowing 
mean that revenue volatility translates into a continual 
need to adjust spending programs or the tax structure to 
achieve a balanced budget, which, as Californians have 
observed, can be a politically difficult and economically 
painful process.
As illustrated in Figure 1,1 the problem of volatility 
is particularly severe in California, which relies more 
strongly than many states on the individual income tax— 
a relatively unstable source of revenue, since income fluc-
tuates more than sales or property assessments during a 
typical business cycle (Auerbach, 2010). Moreover, Califor-
nia’s income tax tends to be more volatile than the income 
taxes in other states, because it relies heavily on sources 
of income subject to large swings, including capital gains. 
Absent any prospect of significant increases in property 
tax collections, a stronger reliance on consumption taxes 
would be the most obvious path to greater revenue stability, 
because consumption tends to fluctuate less than income.
As for competitiveness, the benefit of relying more 
heavily on consumption taxes is that they increase the 
cost of purchasing consumer goods and services, rather 
than the cost of producing them. Thus, a shift from taxing 
income to taxing consumption would lower production 
costs in California relative to those in other states, making 
California a more attractive place for businesses to locate 
their productive assets and to employ workers. Although 
this might seem to shift the burden of taxation from 
residents of other states to Californians as consumers, the 
mobility of capital among states means that California 
Figure 1. State and local tax revenues are particularly volatile
in California
SOURCE: Adapted from Auerbach (2010).
NOTE: No data for 2001 and 2003 (per dotted lines).
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Revenue volatility forces California to make frequent budgetary adjustments.
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ultimately has little ability to shift taxes to the residents of 
other states, anyway, through lower rates of return on their 
investments in California. Rather than accepting lower 
rates of return, investors can locate their business opera-
tions elsewhere.
One important factor confronting California and 
other states as they contemplate taxing consumption is 
that the ability of states to tax purchases from out-of-state 
vendors remains very much in doubt. Under evolving case 
law, most importantly the 1992 Supreme Court decision in 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (which dealt with mail-order 
sales), states may not require out-of-state vendors to collect 
sales tax on purchases by state residents unless the vendors 
have sufficient nexus within the state. This ruling has been 
interpreted as prohibiting the taxation of Internet sales by 
companies whose only connection to the state is through 
remote sales. One consequence has been that states such as 
California that impose a retail sales tax on other purchases 
must instead attempt to collect a use tax from Internet 
buyers (i.e., a tax imposed on purchasers in lieu of the 
sales tax)—an approach that has met with very little suc-
cess to date. Although the decision in Quill indicated that 
congressional legislation could relax this restriction, no 
serious consideration of such national legislation has been 
undertaken. Some states, beginning with New York, have 
recently attempted to sidestep this restriction on their own 
(requiring that companies such as Amazon.com collect 
sales tax on Internet sales) by broadening their interpreta-
tion of nexus to include close business relationships with 
in-state companies.2 Although there has been some judicial 
success to date in state courts with regard to taxing Inter-
net sales (e.g., Amazon.com LLC v. New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance, 2009), the Supreme Court 
has yet to determine the viability of such recent initiatives. 
Moreover, such legislation, even if successful, might cover 
only a small fraction of Internet sales.
In thinking about the type of consumption tax Cali-
fornia might wish to impose, one issue to consider is the 
ease of its administration and enforcement, in particular 
whether it might be better to work within the existing 
sales tax system or to implement an alternative system. In 
response to a recent movement to replace the U.S. federal 
tax system with a national retail sales tax, some analysis 
has suggested that such a tax would be more susceptible to 
tax evasion than a value added tax, because of the manner 
in which the value added tax is collected—from producers  
at all stages of production, rather than just at the retail 
level.3 The problem of tax evasion is less severe at the state 
level, because state sales tax rates are much lower than 
federal rates but the information-gathering ability of the 
federal government is greater than that of individual states. 
This means that adoption of a particular type of consump-
tion tax at the state level might meet with more adminis-
trative success if such a tax were also adopted at the federal 
level. This would be true for a retail sales tax, were the fed-
eral government to adopt one, and also for a value added 
tax. As discussed below, an excellent model for this type of  
coordinated reform would be the recent Canadian adoption 
of a national VAT with the gradual harmonization of taxes 
on the same base at the provincial level.
Much of the recent discussion of consumption taxa-
tion in the United States has focused on the national 
level. In that discussion, some proponents have viewed a 
Legal and administrative barriers make it difficult to collect taxes on 
Internet sales.
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consumption tax as a substitute for one or more existing 
taxes, whereas others have seen it as an additional source 
of revenue to help address the very large federal budget 
deficit. It is worth noting that some of the arguments that 
may be familiar regarding consumption taxation at the 
national level carry over to the state level, but some do not. 
It is also worth noting that some state-level issues may be 
less relevant at the national level: 
• A shift toward consumption taxation would likely 
reduce the volatility of tax revenues at both the federal 
and state levels, but revenue volatility is a more signifi-
cant concern at the state level, because of the borrow-
ing restrictions that states face.
• A consumption tax at the national level would not be 
subject to the legal restraints imposed on individual 
states in the taxation of remote sales. 
• At the national level, taxing consumption, rather than 
production (through income taxes), would not spur 
U.S. domestic production with respect to trade with 
other countries, because any apparent increase in U.S. 
competitiveness would be countered through move-
ments in the exchange rate. That is, a policy of reduc-
ing the tax on U.S. production and increasing the  
tax on U.S. consumption would cause the dollar to 
appreciate relative to other currencies, and this would 
offset the apparent increase in international competi-
tiveness arising from reduced production costs.4 At 
the state level, consumption taxes would promote 
competitiveness with respect to other states, because 
no offsetting exchange rate movements are possible: 
the states share a fixed exchange rate via their common 
currency, the dollar. 
• One argument for a national consumption tax is that 
it would encourage capital accumulation (and there-
fore spur productivity growth and higher incomes) by 
reducing the tax burden on savings and investments. 
For an individual state acting on its own, even one as 
large as California, this potential economic benefit 
would be smaller, because the tax policies in other 
states would remain the same and would continue to 
affect the saving and investment decisions of Califor-
nians. Thus, promotion of capital accumulation is a 
stronger argument for consumption taxes adopted at 
the national level. Taxes on savings and investments 
may also be less attractive policies at the state level, 
because the interstate mobility of capital makes invest-
ment location sensitive to a given state’s capital income 
taxes. This sensitivity of investment to state capital 
income taxes increases the attractiveness to states of 
consumption taxes, because consumers are less mobile 
across state boundaries. 
• Finally, taxes adopted at the state and federal levels 
differ in their short-run macroeconomic consequences. 
Therefore, macroeconomic considerations should be 
of less concern at the state level. Although a perceived 
benefit of consumption taxes is their encouragement of 
saving, rather than current consumption, discouraging 
consumption may be a drawback in periods of reces-
sion, when the government might seek strong consumer 
demand to help spur economic recovery. However, 
because many of the goods and services purchased 
in one state are produced elsewhere, the effect of one 
state’s consumption tax on its own local employment 
will be considerably attenuated by interstate spillovers. 
That is, although a single state’s tax policy may affect 
consumption purchases and employment nationwide, 
only a fraction of this effect will occur within the state’s 
borders. Thus, from the state’s perspective, the macro-
economic effects are small. On the other hand, at the 
federal level, most of the effects on consumption pur-
chases and employment of a nationwide consumption 
tax will remain within national borders. As a result, the 
Revenue volatility is a more significant concern 
at the state level, because of the  
borrowing restrictions that states face.   
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short-run macroeconomic consequences of tax policy 
would represent a more important issue for the country 
as a whole than for an individual state.
In sum, for California, the attractiveness of a con-
sumption tax lies in its ability to reduce revenue volatility 
and increase competitiveness. Federal action could ease the 
challenges of adopting a consumption tax by permitting 
the taxation of sales by out-of-state vendors or by estab-
lishing an administrative infrastructure for tax collection 
and enforcement through the adoption of a national-level 
consumption tax. However, one cannot assume that federal 
action will occur, so one should consider the viability of 
different alternatives in its absence.
California’s Retail  Sales Tax:  
The Need for Reform
In the 2009–10 fiscal year, California collected roughly  
$27 billion in sales and use taxes for the state’s general 
fund, $45 billion in individual income taxes, and $10 bil-
lion in corporate income taxes (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 
2010). These three taxes together consistently account for 
over 90 percent of the state’s general fund revenues. Taking 
into account local as well as state government finances, 
California relies more on each of these taxes and less on 
the one remaining major state and local tax—the property 
tax—than does the typical state. Thus, although property 
taxes are the primary direct source of tax revenue for local 
governments, California raises a larger share of its taxes at 
the state level. Both of these patterns are directly attribut-
able to property tax limits imposed in the late 1970s with 
the passage of Proposition 13.
The simplest approach to accomplishing a shift away 
from the volatile income tax would be to increase the state’s 
retail sales tax rate. However, at its current 8.25 percent rate 
(including a base rate of 1 percent distributed to local govern-
ments), California’s state sales tax rate is already the highest 
in the country (Tax Policy Center, 2011).5 Thus, alternatives 
to a rate increase merit more serious consideration.
A retail sales tax is generally considered a consumption 
tax, because its base includes household retail consumption 
expenditures. However, in California and elsewhere, there 
are two key differences between consumption and the basics 
of the sales tax. First, the tax base excludes many elements of 
household consumption. In some cases, these exclusions are 
aimed at encouraging the exempt activity (such as educa-
tion) or at lessening expenses for lower-income individuals 
or those facing large medical purchases (e.g., prescription 
drugs). In other cases, including Internet and mail-order 
sales by out-of-state vendors without sufficient nexus, legal 
or administrative barriers make it difficult to collect sales 
taxes. In still other cases, the traditionally limited appli-
cation of the sales tax to purchases of tangible goods has 
hindered the extension of the tax to cover services. 
As shown in Figure 2, services have been growing 
steadily as a share of overall household consumption in 
the United States over the past 60 years, from less than 
two-fifths of household consumption in 1949 to roughly 
two-thirds today. And thus, predictably, taxable sales 
in California (which taxes relatively fewer services than 
most other states) have fallen steadily relative to personal 
income, from 53 percent in 1979 to just 29 percent three 
decades later, in 2009 (Figure 3). More than 80 percent of 
California forgoes billions in revenue each year by exempting many 
household purchases (including medication) from its sales tax.
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personal income was spent on consumption nationally in 
2009, with a presumably similar percentage in California; 
this means that California’s retail sales base is less than 
half as large as total consumption. This is a lot of consump-
tion excluded from taxation, whether by design or legal 
restriction. However, the share of consumption being taxed 
is even smaller than this, because a large share of what is 
included in the retail sales tax base is not consumption  
but purchases by businesses. One estimate is that roughly 
45 percent of California sales tax revenues in 2003 came 
from taxes on business purchases (Council on State 
Taxation, 2005). Taken together, these statistics suggest 
that perhaps only one-fifth of California consumption is 
directly subject to the retail sales tax.6 
Thus, the sales tax in California, as in other states, fails 
to tax a large share of consumption, and a large share of its 
base (business purchases) does not involve consumption. 
Each of these deviations from a consumption tax makes 
the retail sales tax less attractive as a revenue source. The 
exclusion of a large share of consumption expenditures dis-
torts the purchasing decisions that households make, nota-
bly encouraging purchases of untaxed services relative to 
taxed goods. The inclusion of many business purchases in 
the tax base amounts to a tax on production in California, 
because a business must pay the tax regardless of how its 
products are used or where they are sold. This tax on pro-
duction raises the cost of doing business in California rela-
tive to other states. Furthermore, to the extent that the tax 
on business inputs can ultimately be passed on to consum-
ers, it may further distort consumer choice in California 
by severely raising the price of consumer goods involving 
several stages of production. This is because, with business 
inputs taxed at each stage of production, a cascade of taxes 
will result, and the total effective tax rate on final sales to 
consumers may end up being substantially higher than the 
sales tax rate itself. For example, suppose that a farmer sells 
cotton to a shirt manufacturer for $30, the manufacturer 
sells the shirt produced with this cotton to a retailer for $60, 
and the retailer sells the shirt to a consumer for $90. The 
total tax base if each sale is subject to tax is $180, double the 
final price of the shirt sold to the consumer. Hence, a sales 
Figure 2. Nationally, services as a share of household
consumption have grown steadily 
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure 3. In California, increased spending on services has added 
to a sharp decline in taxable sales
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and California State Board of Equalization. 
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The exclusion of a large share of consumption 
expenditures distorts the purchasing decisions 
that households make.  
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tax of 10 percent on each sale will collect the same revenue 
as a 20 percent tax on consumption.
In sum, the sales tax in California provides a stable 
source of revenue but one that is not growing as fast as 
household income and expenditures, because of the  
ongoing shift toward purchases of untaxed services, which 
are also encouraged, because of their favorable tax treat-
ment. At the same time, much of what is taxed under the 
rubric of a sales tax does not involve consumption, and  
the taxation of business purchases weakens the competi-
tiveness of California businesses relative to that of other 
states and may further distort household consumption 
choices through the cumulative effect of several layers of 
tax on the prices of some consumer goods. Because the 
effects of any tax on the decisions of households and busi-
nesses increase in strength as the tax rate rises, these short-
comings would be aggravated by an increase in the rate of 
the sales tax. Thus, any move to increase the importance 
of the retail sales tax as a revenue source should include 
reforms focusing on the tax itself.
Potential Consumption Tax Reforms
A number of options are available, should California choose 
to shift its focus toward consumption taxation. Five pos-
sibilities include: reforming the retail sales tax, to include 
more service expenditures and fewer business inputs; modi-
fying the corporate income tax, to include more businesses 
and make it more closely resemble a tax on consumption; 
adopting a gross receipts tax; adopting a state-level value 
added tax; and adopting a business net receipts tax.
The first two reforms would involve modifications of 
existing taxes, the third would introduce a tax that would 
be new to California, and the last two would introduce 
taxes that do not yet exist in any state. Table 1 provides a 
brief summary of how each of these taxes operates. 
Reforming the Retail Sales Tax
The possibility of modifying the retail sales tax in Cali-
fornia has received considerable attention over the years, 
with three potential reforms most frequently discussed: 
(1) finding a way to tax more Internet sales and other sales 
by out-of-state vendors, (2) extending the tax to cover a 
greater share of services, and (3) reducing or eliminating 
the tax on goods and services purchased by businesses.
The first of these reforms depends on congressional  
(or possibly judicial) action, which limits the usefulness of 
an in-depth discussion here. However, it is worth noting 
that such a reform would be desirable if it were legally  
feasible. Except for the difficulties of tax administration, 
The sales tax in California provides a stable 
source of revenue but one that is not growing as 
fast as household income and expenditures. 
Table 1. Alternative tax systems
Tax system Tax base Tax base determination
Retail sales tax Retail sales in California, including some 
sales to businesses
Directly based on sales in California, subject to limits on Internet and 
mail-order sales
Corporate income tax Income of corporations National income, apportioned; currently based either on sales or on a 
combination of sales, payroll, and assets
Gross receipts tax Gross receipts Directly based on gross receipts
Value added tax Value added, equal to business income 
plus wages and salaries
Directly based on California value added, equal to gross receipts less 
the cost of business inputs; subject to limit on remote sales
Business net receipts tax Value added, equal to business income 
plus wages and salaries
National value added apportioned on the basis of sales
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there is no coherent argument for favoring sales through 
one channel over sales of the same or similar items 
through another, and there is a considerable amount of 
money at stake. According to one recent projection (Bruce 
and Fox, 2004, Table 5), the state lost between $2.3 billion 
and $3.6 billion of retail sales tax collections on electronic 
commerce sales in 2008. However, the authors estimate 
that some of this revenue would not have been collected 
even if e-commerce were taxable, and it appears from the 
same estimates that about three-quarters of this loss was 
attributable to business-to-business sales, which we will 
argue should probably not be taxed.7 Even so, a potential 
revenue gain in the hundreds of millions of dollars a year 
would be involved, at the current tax rate.
The other two potential modifications cut in opposite 
directions in terms of revenue, with increased coverage of 
services raising revenue and excluding business inputs from 
tax reducing revenue. There are good arguments for con-
sidering these two changes together, rather than piecemeal, 
because these reforms tend by their structure to be comple-
mentary in their effects. One argument in favor of main-
taining a tax on business inputs is that it may be difficult for 
some producers to distinguish between sales to consumers 
and sales to other producers. Another is that many of the 
inputs are purchased by businesses that provide untaxed 
services to consumers, as in the case, for example, of the 
products used by a hair salon or the pencils and paper used 
by a law office. Thus, it is not obvious that simply remov- 
ing all taxes on business inputs would be a step in the right 
direction, given its revenue cost. Nonetheless, a tax on 
business inputs is a poor substitute for a tax on final sales 
to consumers, because it discourages the use of taxed 
inputs, rather than other inputs (such as labor), imposes a 
lower effective tax rate than a tax on final sales by taxing 
only some inputs, and taxes input purchases by producers 
whose sales are already subject to tax on final sales. Thus, 
moving toward more comprehensive taxation of final sales 
would strengthen the case for reducing or eliminating the 
tax on business inputs, to the extent that this elimination 
would be practical.
However, in considering a move toward more inclu-
sive taxation of services, one should remember that many 
services are provided to other businesses. Like existing 
taxation of business inputs, taxation of services purchased 
by businesses would be generally undesirable and inconsis-
tent with the aim of taxing final consumption. Thus, if the 
taxation of services were extended without distinguishing 
the identity of the purchaser (i.e., final consumer versus 
business), it would make sense to focus on services pri-
marily purchased by consumers, such as medical services, 
amusements and recreation, education services, personal 
services, and automobile repairs (Council on State Taxa-
tion, 2005), while exempting services in such areas as 
advertising and engineering, which are purchased almost 
entirely by businesses.
A more comprehensive tax on final sales would make it possible to reduce 
or eliminate taxes on business inputs.
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Beyond the three reforms already mentioned, there is  
a fourth that receives less attention than it deserves: the tax 
exemption for a range of significant purchases of tangible 
items by households of limited means. The Legislative 
Analyst’s Office estimated that in the 2008–09 fiscal year, 
the three largest such exemptions—for food products; gas, 
electricity, water, and steam; and prescription medications—
accounted for a loss of $7.8 billion from the state general 
fund, or nearly one-tenth of the entire general fund budget. 
About half of this loss is due to the first exemption, for food 
products (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2008).8
The logic for exempting these items is clear—to reduce 
the tax burden on the purchase of necessities by people 
of limited means, because of low income or high medical 
expenses. However, exemption of all purchases in these 
categories is a costly and inefficient way to reduce the tax 
burden of the needy, because most of the purchases in 
these categories are not made by the target group. That is, 
although the poor may spend a disproportionate share of 
their income on food, most food is not purchased by the 
poor. Other approaches to addressing the distributional 
effects of taxation, such as the provision of food stamps 
or other low-income supplements, can achieve the same 
objective at a fraction of the revenue cost and would also 
eliminate the current tax system’s encouragement to pur-
chase exempt commodities over taxed ones.
California is like many other states in providing  
these exemptions from sales tax, but a number of states 
do not provide such exemptions. According to the Tax 
Policy Center (2011), seven states fully taxed food in 2010 
(Alabama, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
and South Dakota) with most providing a rebate or income 
tax credit to compensate low-income households. Another 
seven states (Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, and West Virginia) imposed some sales tax on 
food, although at a lower rate than on other goods.
In sum, California could increase sales tax revenues 
while reducing the economic distortions of the tax by 
expanding its coverage to more services and currently 
exempt commodities, using some of the added revenue to 
reduce the tax on business inputs and providing assistance 
to offset the adverse effects on low-income households.  
(As shown in the appendix, a move away from the taxation 
of business inputs may, in itself, contribute to a progres-
sive shift in the tax burden, from labor to capital.) An 
additional benefit would come from extending coverage 
to remote sales by out-of-state vendors currently subject 
only to use tax, if this were to prove feasible. All of these 
changes would be relatively straightforward to implement.
Modification of the Corporate Income Tax
Although a corporate income tax appears to be a tax on 
corporate income, the manner in which it is imposed, with 
the share of a company’s national income that is taxed 
in California determined by a so-called apportionment 
formula, may cause it to more closely resemble a tax on 
consumption. Hence, modification of the corporate income 
tax may serve to shift the tax base toward consumption. 
This point is developed more fully below.
Like most states, California imposes a separate income 
tax on corporations operating within the state. But a com-
plication arises in determining the tax liability for Califor-
nia corporations that operate in other states as well. As in 
other states, a corporation’s California tax base is deter-
mined not by how much income the corporation earns in 
California but rather by an apportionment formula that 
determines the share of the corporation’s U.S. income that 
is attributed to California. The primary reason for using an 
apportionment formula is to avoid the need for companies 
to account separately for profits earned in each state in 
In the 2008–09 fiscal year, exemptions  
for food products; gas, electricity,  
water, and steam; and prescription medications 
accounted for a loss of $7.8 billion from  
the state general fund.
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which they operate. Instead, national profits are allocated 
among states based on relatively observable measures of a 
firm’s economic activities in each state. 
States rely on three factors to determine the apportion-
ment of corporate income—assets, payroll, and sales—
commonly assigning an equal weight to each factor in the 
formula. For example, a corporation with 15 percent of its 
assets, 20 percent of its payroll, and 10 percent of its sales 
located in California would be subject to California tax on 
15 percent (⅓ × 15 + ⅓ × 20 + ⅓ × 10) of its U.S. income. 
Over the years, many states have moved to apply more 
weight to the location of sales than to the other factors. As 
of 2010, for example, California and several other states 
applied a double-weight to sales (giving one-half the weight 
to sales and one-quarter the weight each to assets and 
payroll), and a number of other states relied only on sales 
to determine corporate income. Furthermore, legislation 
passed in February 2009 allows corporate taxpayers (as of 
January 1, 2011) the option to annually choose to use only 
the sales factor in determing the apportionment of their 
corporate income, rather than continuing to use the three-
factor formula with sales double-weighted.9
A corporate income tax is, of course, not a tax on  
consumption, and so it has one characteristic that a con-
sumption tax does not—volatility. Regardless of how a 
corporation’s income is apportioned by states, the income 
itself is very volatile—more volatile than income in the 
economy overall—and so will be any particular state’s 
share of this income based on its apportionment formula 
and its tax rate. Thus, heavier reliance on the corporate 
income tax is likely to increase revenue volatility. In other 
respects, though, a corporate income tax can resemble a 
consumption tax in its effect, in particular with respect to 
a focus on consumption purchases, rather than production, 
in California. 
A shift in formula apportionment toward sales would 
indeed represent a step in this direction. As emphasized in 
the economics literature (see, e.g., McLure, 1980), a state’s 
corporate income tax, although formally a tax on corporate 
income, can resemble, in its effect, a tax on the measure 
used for apportionment. For example, a tax apportionment 
based on the location of assets can resemble a property tax, 
because it raises the cost of having property in the state; 
following similar logic, a tax apportionment based on 
payroll can resemble a payroll tax, and a tax apportionment 
based on sales can resemble a sales tax. Thus, the California 
corporate income tax based on all three factors would have 
effects simulating all three taxes, whereas a formula based 
only on sales would resemble a sales tax. Empirical evidence 
is consistent with this reasoning, showing that a shift in 
apportionment weights from payroll and assets to sales has 
been associated with increases in in-state employment. For 
example, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) found, in a study of 
the effects of changes in state apportionment formulas over 
the period 1978–1994, that a switch from equal three-factor 
weighting to double sales weighting increased in-state 
manufacturing employment by approximately 1.1 percent 
on average.
Given that sales-only apportionment is now available 
to corporate taxpayers in California, there remain three 
important issues to address. First, allowing a corporate 
taxpayer to choose between the traditional three-factor 
apportionment formula and sales-only apportionment will 
lead to a considerable loss in tax revenue (relative to the 
mandatory use of either apportionment formula), because 
a taxpayer will choose the option that offers lower tax 
liability. Also, this provision introduces variation in the 
effective tax rate on sales, depending on where produc-
tion occurs. Consider, for example, two corporations. The 
first generates its product in California and sells it nation-
ally (including in California), and the second generates its 
Allowing a corporate taxpayer  
to choose between the traditional  
three-factor apportionment formula and  
sales-only apportionment will lead  
to a considerable loss in tax revenue.
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product outside California and sells it nationally (including 
in California). The corporation generating the first product 
will opt for sales-only weighting, which will minimize its 
California tax payment, because most of its sales occur 
elsewhere, even though its assets and payroll are located in 
California. The corporation generating the second product 
will opt for the three-factor formula, since with its payroll 
and assets outside California, its California tax payment 
will be reduced by including these in the calculation. The 
corporate tax will work much more like a consumption 
tax in the case of the first company, increasing the cost 
of selling to California consumers. As a consequence, 
California purchasers will face a higher effective sales tax 
rate on the first product than on the second, because the 
burden faced by consumers will be the same as if the added 
cost of sales were formally imposed on them, as is the case 
with sales taxes, rather than on producers. As already 
discussed in the context of California’s existing retail sales 
tax, such variation in tax rates distorts consumer choice 
and is therefore undesirable. Thus, a mandatory sales-only 
formula would be preferable to one that provides a choice.
Second, the California corporate income tax, like the 
U.S. federal corporate income tax, applies only to corpo-
rations, thereby giving rise to a large distortion between 
corporate and noncorporate producers. Aside from issues 
of tax administration and compliance, there is no coherent 
argument for treating corporate and noncorporate pro-
duction distinctly. Given that a growing share of business 
activity in the United States occurs outside the business 
model subject to regular corporate taxation—including  
S corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, 
and sole proprietorships10—the economic significance of 
this distinction has grown. If a sales-apportioned corporate 
income tax simulates the effect of a tax on sales by corpo-
rations, it does not do so for the sales by noncorporate  
producers, thus distorting consumer choice between 
corporate and noncorporate products. Hence, a reform 
of the corporate income tax laws to allow similar treat-
ment of corporate and noncorporate taxpayers would lead 
to a more uniform effective taxation of sales. A simple 
approach in this direction would be to extend the corpo-
rate income tax to large (as measured by assets or income) 
noncorporate entities (with adjustments to the overall tax 
rate possible if an increase in revenue was not the aim). 
Third, as already discussed in relation to the retail 
sales tax, a tax on sales is not the same as a consumption 
tax to the extent that it includes intermediate sales to other 
producers. Taxing intermediate sales distorts business 
organization and consumer choice, discouraging produc-
tion in vertical chains and the consumption of goods that 
are produced in this manner. Logically, if a sales-weighted 
corporate income tax resembles a state tax on corporate 
sales, then one would expect from it the same distortions 
of consumer choice and business organization. Indeed, as 
discussed in the technical appendix, this is what economic 
analysis predicts. A sales-weighted corporate income tax 
will discourage the sale of business inputs in the state in 
much the same way that a tax on all sales (including inter-
mediate sales) would, because such sales increase the appor-
tionment weight applied to the company’s profits. However, 
from the standpoint of encouraging economic activity, 
weighting only by sales would still represent an improve-
ment over a system that includes assets in the apportion-
ment formula, because inclusion of a factor based on assets 
exerts a strong incentive for mobile capital to leave the state. 
Also, apportionment based (in whole or in part) on sales 
is subject to strategic behavior on the part of companies, 
which can reduce their tax liability in California simply 
by engaging in low-profit-margin business in other states, 
essentially buying and then reselling items elsewhere. 
Both of these problems—the implicit tax on inter-
mediate sales to businesses and the incentive to develop 
A reform of the corporate income tax laws  
to allow similar treatment of corporate  
and noncorporate taxpayers would lead to a 
more uniform effective taxation of sales. 
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low-margin activities in other states—relate not just to 
California’s tax system but to the tax systems of other states 
as well, because if other states have similar tax rates and 
tax provisions, there will be no reduction in taxes from 
shifting activities elsewhere. However, as a state with tax 
rates higher than most other states, California faces these 
problems even when one takes into account the tax systems 
of other states. One might see a possible solution to these 
problems in basing apportionment only on final sales rather 
than on intermediate sales, but this approach would give 
rise to another avenue for strategic tax avoidance: a com-
pany could simply move its production operations out of 
state and establish an independent low-margin retail entity 
in California to which it would make intermediate sales.
Also, perhaps contrary to intuition (and as discussed 
further in the technical appendix), a sales-apportioned 
capital income tax, such as a corporate income tax, would 
actually fall more heavily on in-state capital and less heav-
ily on in-state labor than a capital income tax based on the 
three-factor apportionment. This is because the other two 
factors (payroll and assets) both weigh more heavily than 
sales on labor income—the first directly as a tax on labor and 
the second because the mobility of capital means that taxes 
on capital cause capital to flee the state; the reduced amount 
of capital in the state leaves labor less productive and hence 
lowers the wages that labor can earn in competitive labor 
markets where wages depend on labor productivity. 
In sum, adapting the state corporate income tax to 
make it take on more of the beneficial attributes of a broad-
based consumption tax would involve extending its reach 
beyond the corporate business sector and adopting a man-
datory sales-only apportionment formula. The resulting 
system, although improved, would still fall short of a true 
consumption tax in its effects, because of the underlying 
volatility of the tax base, relative to consumption, and the 
implicit taxation of intermediate sales, because such sales 
are included when determining a company’s tax liability 
in California and the strategic tax avoidance opportunities 
inherent in the sales-apportionment method, because com-
panies can reduce their California tax liability by increas-
ing low-margin sales activity in other states. 
Introducing a Gross Receipts Tax
A gross receipts tax is, as the name suggests, a tax on the 
gross receipts of a business. In some respects, it resembles 
the retail sales tax and the value added tax, so it may be 
perceived as providing one particular way of implementing 
a tax on consumption. In fact, it is not.
Unlike the retail sales tax, a gross receipts tax applies 
to receipts from all sales, including all sales to other busi-
nesses. Unlike a value added tax, it does not provide credits 
to businesses for taxes already paid on purchased inputs. 
One consequence of these features is that a gross receipts 
tax has a very broad base, so that it can generate a lot of 
revenue at a relatively low tax rate. In addition, this tax 
is relatively simple to implement, since doing so does not 
require that the government determine whether sales are to 
households or businesses (since all sales are taxable) or keep 
track of taxes paid by businesses on their purchased inputs 
(since these taxes are not deductible from a company’s own 
tax liability). Finally, as with the retail sales tax, the gross 
receipts tax provides a relatively stable source of revenue.
Perhaps in part because of these features—breadth 
of the tax base, simplicity of implementation, and stabil-
ity of revenue—gross receipts taxes have enjoyed a recent 
Value added taxes are common around the world, but not in the  
United States.
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renewal of popularity. For many decades, this tax existed 
as a vestige of rudimentary, early 20th century tax policy 
still in place in a few states that had not gotten around 
to replacing it with a superior, more modern alternative. 
However, several states have recently introduced the gross 
receipts tax, either as a stand-alone tax or as an option 
under a broader tax. These states include Ohio (2005),  
Kentucky (2007), Michigan (2008), and Texas (2008).
Unfortunately, the gross receipts tax has a serious flaw 
that is inherent in its structure and not easily addressed 
through modification. Like taxation of business inputs 
under the retail sales tax, the gross receipts tax causes a 
cascade of taxes in the case of any goods or services pro-
duced by a sequence of businesses, rather than just a single 
business. This feature distorts the organization of produc-
tion toward vertical integration (to reduce tax liabilities) 
and discourages demand for products that are difficult 
to produce within a single, vertically integrated business. 
Although taxation of business inputs is incomplete under 
the retail sales tax and might, as discussed, be reduced 
through reform, this feature is essentially the defining 
characteristic of the gross receipts tax. Thus, adoption of 
a gross receipts tax would worsen the taxation of business 
inputs relative to the current retail sales tax and certainly 
relative to a reformed sales tax. Aside from its simplicity, 
the only potential argument in favor of the gross receipts 
tax is that, as a tax on business receipts, rather than sales,  
it is arguably not subject to the legal restrictions on the 
taxation of remote sales in the state. That is, it appears 
possible to tax a remote seller’s gross receipts on its in-state 
sales, even if these sales cannot be taxed under a retail sales 
tax system.11  
Introducing a Value Added Tax
Like retail sales taxes based only on sales to consumers, a 
value added tax can be used to implement a broad-based 
tax on consumption. However, unlike the sales tax, which 
taxes only final sales, a value added tax imposes tax in 
stages, as production occurs. Although a producer at 
each stage is formally liable for the tax on its entire sales, 
it receives credits for taxes paid on previously produced 
inputs to avoid the cascading effect of intermediate goods 
taxation. Also, the value added tax provides a tax rebate to 
purchasers for final sales other than for domestic consump-
tion (e.g., for investment or export), and this ensures that 
only consumption remains in the tax base.
Although value added taxes are common around the 
world, there is no federal value added tax in the United 
States. An individual state acting on its own could, in prin-
ciple, introduce a value added tax, but this would involve 
imposing a tax on imports from out of state, whether by 
businesses or individuals, an approach that would likely 
face the same legal obstacles as the retail sales tax in impos-
ing a tax on out-of-state vendors without sufficient nexus.
Were the United States to adopt a national value 
added tax, the potential advantages of a similar state-level 
tax would increase, particularly if such national taxation 
brought with it a relaxation of the restrictions on the appli-
cation of state value added taxes to out-of-state vendors. 
In that case, not only would the legal path to adoption of a 
true state-level VAT be clear, but national adoption would 
also facilitate enforcement and collection of such a tax by 
states through the coordinated activities of federal and state 
governments. A model for this coordination, described in 
the text box below, is the Canadian Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), and the taxes recently adopted by several provinces 
in coordination with the GST, referred to as Harmonized 
Sales Tax (HST).12  
In sum, a value added tax imposed at the state level 
would have many of the same attractions and limitations as 
a reformed retail sales tax. As discussed above, some have 
argued that the value added tax would be less susceptible 
to tax evasion than the retail sales tax, but one would need 
Were the United States to adopt a national 
value added tax, the potential advantages of a 
similar state-level tax would increase.
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to weigh this potential advantage against the administra-
tive costs of imposing a new tax that differs fundamentally 
from those in place in other states.
Introducing a Sales-Apportioned Tax  
Based on Value Added
Perhaps reflecting both the attractiveness of the value 
added tax as well as the challenge of adopting such a tax at 
the state level without national coordination, California’s 
Commission on the 21st Century Economy proposed a 
modified version of the value added tax that would not  
be subject to the nexus issues. Under its proposed busi- 
ness net receipts tax, tax liability in California would be 
based not on California value added but rather on national 
value added, with sales-only formula apportionment used 
to determine California’s share of the total. This appor-
tioned VAT (which under the proposal would have applied 
to companies over a certain size threshold) would have 
introduced the same approach to value added taxation—
sales-only apportionment based on a national tax base—
that is now a taxpayer option under the state corporate 
income tax.
As its name suggests, the BNRT was characterized as 
a tax on business, but aside from its similar approach to 
apportionment, it differed from a sales-weighted corporate 
income tax in three important respects. First, it would have 
applied to all businesses, not just corporations. Second, it 
would have applied to all value added, i.e., returns to capi-
tal and labor, rather than providing a deduction for wages 
as under the corporate income tax. And, finally, since its 
national tax base would have been all value added, rather 
than just returns to capital, the revenues it generated would 
have been less volatile, like those from a consumption tax. 
The first of these differences, as already discussed  
in relation to the corporate income tax, would represent  
an improvement but also one that could be accomplished  
by extending the coverage of the corporate income tax.  
The second difference, inclusion of labor as well as capi- 
tal in the tax base, is of importance primarily in terms  
of how the burden of taxation is borne by various groups  
of individuals. As discussed in the appendix, and perhaps 
not surprisingly, the BNRT would fall more heavily on 
labor in California, and less heavily on capital, than would 
a sales-apportioned capital income tax, that is, a BNRT 
amended to exclude wages and salaries from the tax base 
being apportioned. Thus, BNRT has two potential advan-
tages over the sales-apportioned corporate income tax.  
The first, primarily a political advantage, is the relative ease 
with which it might be applied to the noncorporate busi-
ness sector. Second is the reduced volatility of its revenue 
base. The opportunities for strategic tax avoidance through 
Value added tax reform in Canada 
Introduced in 1991, the GST is a national value added tax. 
Although provinces were free to maintain their own pre-
existing retail sales taxes, similar in form to those used by 
U.S. states, they had an option of coordinating tax collection 
activities with the national government by adopting the HST. 
Under the HST, provinces conform their tax bases to the  
GST but have the option to choose their own tax rate. In 
exchange for this tax base conformance, the federal govern-
ment collects tax on behalf of the province and then transfers 
collected revenues to it. Rebates are based on national esti-
mates of the location of business activity, making it unneces-
sary to keep track of all individual taxpayer transactions.
 The HST was initially adopted in 1997 by three small 
provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and 
New Brunswick. A provincially administered tax, the Quebec 
Sales Tax, had already essentially conformed to the base 
of the GST in 1995. In 2010, Ontario and British Columbia 
switched from a retail sales tax to the HST, thus bringing the 
bulk of Canada’s overall economic activity under a conformed 
provincial tax system. As of 2010, the rates in these provinces 
fell within a relatively narrow band, from 7 to 10 percent.
 Among the benefits of a switch from the retail sales tax  
to the HST is a shift in the focus of taxation away from busi-
ness inputs, including investment goods. Consistent with this 
shift, Smart (2007) reports empirical estimates that provinces 
shifting to the HST experienced increased investment there-
after. The Canadian experience suggests that a state-level 
VAT would be an attractive option for California were the 
United States to adopt a federal VAT. Many have proposed 
this in recent years as one way to deal with the federal fiscal 
imbalance.
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modifications of in-state and out-of-state activities appear 
similar under the two systems.
A VAT imposed using sales-weighted formula appor-
tionment would share the true VAT’s administrative costs  
of novelty and, like the sales-apportioned corporate income  
tax, would not eliminate all of the economic distortions 
that a consumption tax would create. But, like a consump-
tion tax, it would provide a less volatile revenue stream, 
and it might conceivably be more easily applied to noncor-
porate businesses than the existing corporate income tax.
Conclusion
Most of the options outlined in this report (the gross 
receipts tax being a likely exception) would promote com-
petitiveness by shifting California’s tax system toward one 
that assesses tax based on where products are consumed, 
rather than on where they are produced. The details among 
these options vary in terms of their advantages, disadvan-
tages, and implementation (Table 2). All but the corporate 
income tax reform would provide more revenue stability  
than the existing California state tax system. Reform of  
the retail sales tax or the corporate income tax would work  
within the existing system, possibly making reform more 
straightforward. Only a reformed retail sales tax or a value 
added tax could effectively avoid taxation of business 
inputs, although both are also subject to limits on their 
ability to impose tax on Internet and mail-order sales. 
The retail sales tax is potentially more subject to evasion 
than the value added tax, which would make the latter an 
attractive option in the context of federal VAT adoption. 
The systems vary in the degree to which they would 
share the tax burden between labor and capital, in the form 
of lower after-tax wages and profits, with the business net 
receipts tax imposing the highest burden on labor among 
the reformed systems and a reformed retail sales tax the 
least. A sales-based corporate income tax would also place 
a relatively low burden on labor, but for it not to distort the 
choices between corporate and noncorporate organiza-
tional form, it would need to be extended to cover a larger 
fraction of the business sector. If this were done, then, like 
the reformed retail sales tax, the corporate income tax 
would be less distortionary and more progressive than the 
gross receipts tax.
Of course, there are other ways to break the popula-
tion into groups in thinking about winners and losers. For 
example, it is clear that the extension of the retail sales tax 
to the consumption of goods and services not currently 
subject to taxation would shift the burden onto individuals 
who are heavy purchasers of such commodities as well as on 
the industries that produce them. The expansion of a sales-
apportioned corporate income tax to cover the activities 
of some large noncorporate entities would raise the prices 
of goods and services largely produced by them. Although 
a detailed analysis of the effects on specific groups and 
industries lies beyond the scope of this report, such gains 
and losses are inevitable. One obvious way to address them 
is through a gradual implementation of reform, which 
would reduce its effect and allow time to adjust.
In thinking about these options, one need not view 
them as mutually exclusive. In particular, it would be 
possible to implement reforms of the existing retail sales 
tax and corporate income tax together without giving up 
either tax system. Indeed, this might well be the simplest 
path to improvement, although the history of past attempts 
at reform reminds us of the difficulties that even such a 
straightforward reform would face. ●
A technical appendix to this report is available on the PPIC website: 
www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/611AAR_appendix.pdf
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Table 2.  Summary of options
Tax system
 
retail sales tax
Corporate income 
tax with sales-only 
apportionment Gross receipts tax Value added tax
Business  
net receipts tax
Changes needed Extension of coverage 
to more consumer 
services
Reduction of tax on 
business inputs
Replacement of 
exemptions with 
targeted low-income 
support
Extension of coverage 
to large noncorporate 
businesses
Replacement of 
apportionment 
election with 
mandatory sales-only 
formula
Enactment  
(new system)
Enactment  
(new system)
Enactment  
(new system)
Advantages Revenue stability
Works within existing 
system
A pure consumption 
tax, to the extent that 
business inputs are 
removed from the tax 
base
Works within existing 
system
Ability to tax Internet 
and mail-order sales
Simplicity
Revenue stability
Ability to tax Internet 
and mail-order sales
Revenue stability
A pure consumption 
tax
Revenue stability
Ability to tax Internet 
and mail-order sales
Disadvantages Limited ability to tax 
remote sales
May be particularly 
susceptible to tax 
evasion, especially at 
a higher tax rate
Revenue instability
Implicitly taxes 
business inputs
Requires 
implementation of 
new system
Applies to all business 
inputs, therefore 
causes more 
distortion than other 
approaches
Requires 
implementation of 
new system
Limited ability to  
tax Internet and  
mail-order sales
Requires 
implementation of 
new system
Implicitly taxes 
business inputs
Less progressive than 
other options, as 
measured by share 
of burden borne by 
in-state labor
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Notes
1 The figure plots indexes of state and local tax revenues (with 
1992 values equal to 1) relative to a quadratic trend, using data 
from the U.S. Census of Governments. Values for 2001 and 2003 
are not available in these data.
2 A bill modeled after New York’s statute was introduced in the 
California Assembly as AB 178 in 2009.
3 See President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), 
p. 205.
4 This effect is discussed in Auerbach (1997).
5 This rate includes the temporary surcharge of 1 percentage 
point currently scheduled to expire on July 1, 2011. It does  
not include the additional taxes that may be added by local  
governments, which can lead to total sales tax rates in excess  
of 10 percent.
6 That is, if 45 percent of RST revenues come from taxes on 
business purchases, only 55 percent come from taxes on final 
consumption purchases by households. If the RST base is  
29 percent of personal income, this split implies that 55 percent 
of 29 percent, or 16 percent of personal income, is accounted  
for by consumption. This is one-fifth of the roughly 80 percent  
of personal income that consumption represents.
7 Bruce and Fox do not provide state-by-state estimates broken 
down by consumer and business purchases, so this estimate is 
based on their calculations for the United States as a whole.
8 One should keep in mind that some of this revenue loss, in 
particular for gas, electricity, water, and steam, is for taxes  
currently collected from businesses and should not be counted 
as a potential revenue gain if we were to attempt to avoid impos-
ing a tax on such sales. 
9 This provision would have been repealed by Proposition 24, 
a ballot initiative that was defeated by voters in November 2010. 
Its repeal has also been proposed by Governor Jerry Brown, who 
would replace it with mandatory sales-only apportionment.
10 According to the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board (2010, Table 8), C corporations accounted for 80 percent 
of U.S. business income in 1980. By 2007, the C corporation 
income share had fallen to 53 percent. Much of the growth 
outside the C corporation has occurred through S corporations, 
which are not subject to federal corporate income tax and are 
granted a very favorable tax rate in California.
11 See the discussion of this issue in Pomp and McIntyre (2007).
12 The following discussion relies on the discussion of the GST/
HST system in Bird and Gendron (2010) and Smart (2007). I am 
also grateful to Richard Bird and Michael Smart for clarifying 
discussions regarding how the system works and has evolved.
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